CHINA WEAPONIZES GLOBAL TRADE TO BECOME A COLONIAL EMPIRE

Edward J. O'Boyle PhD
Mayo Research Institute
www.mayoresearch.org
edoboyle737@gmail.com

Globalization must not be a new version of colonialism. John Paul II, 2001a.

In a market economy, the purpose of any trade is mutual gain. For both parties what is gotten is more highly valued, is more useful, than what is given up. A father buys two tickets to a professional baseball game – one for himself and the other for his youngest son -- because the experience of sitting alongside his son is more highly valued than the money given up to purchase the tickets. For the owner of the team the money gotten for the tickets is more highly valued than two empty seats.

However, there is more to a trade than use value. Exchange value means that every exchange must comply with the basic norm of fairness that is embedded in the principle of commutative justice. This principle requires that both parties exchange things of equal value and impose equal burdens on one another. Exchanging things of equal value means that both the father and the owner of the baseball team are free to enter an exchange and are agreed as to the price of the tickets and the seating arrangement. Imposing equal burdens on one another means that the father has to pay for his tickets before he is allowed entry into the ballpark, and the owner must set aside the two seats exclusively for the father and his son. Any failure to comply with those conditions renders the exchange invalid because it is unjust.

THE RULES OF THE GAME

In addition to use value and exchange value, global trades are driven by two fundamental rules of the game: absolute advantage and comparative advantage. The firm that is able to produce a good or service at the lowest cost enjoys an absolute advantage because it is able to offer that good or service at a lower price than *other* producers, thereby expanding its trade, profits, and price on the market. In other words, trade under conditions of absolute advantage results in gain for both trading partners.

Advocates of unfettered global trade based on absolute advantage call attention to those gains all the while dismissing the dislocation and economic hardship experienced by *other* producers, their employees, and suppliers. In the pursuit of absolute advantage, domestic companies can relocate operations to foreign countries, thereby costing domestic workers their jobs, domestic suppliers their customers, and communities and local governments their tax bases. Domestic workers and their families who follow their employers to distant locations are uprooted from extended family members, neighbors, and their communities. Driven by the prospective of greater gains from absolute advantage, domestic companies may impose lower wages on their workers, replace senior high-wage workers with younger low-wage workers, or coerce suppliers into new agreements. Similarly, domestic companies may relocate operations to different parts of the country or switch to different product lines, thereby creating dislocation and economic hardship.

Comparative advantage proceeds from *opportunity* cost -- the cost of producing a given good or service in terms of the amount of some other good or service that might have been produced with the same resources. To illustrate, using the same amount of resources, company A located in the Czech Republic is capable of producing either 2,000 automobile headlamps per day or 4,000 interior LED lights. Company B located in Poland is capable of producing either 2,000 headlamps or 6,000 interior LED lights every day using the same resources.

The Czech company has a comparative advantage in producing headlamps because for the Polish firm the *opportunity* cost to produce 2000 headlamps is higher: 6000 LED lights compared to 4000 for the Czech company. At the same time, the Polish firm has a comparative advantage with LED lights because for the Czech firm the *opportunity* cost to produce 2000 LED lights is higher: 1000 headlamps compared to 666 for the Polish firm. The Czech company should specialize in headlamps, the Polish company should specialize in LED lights, and through a bi-lateral trade agreement both countries would have less expensive headlamps and LED lights than if both companies did not execute that agreement.

CHINA DOESN'T PLAY BY THE RULES

China doesn't play by the rules. Where it has an absolute advantage, China pursues it relentlessly. By means of low wages for Chinese workers, reverse engineering, stealing intellectual property and trade secrets, manipulating its currency, and subsidizing its exporters, China is positioning itself to become the lowest cost producer of a huge range of manufactured goods around the globe. There is simply no room in China's global trade policy for comparative advantage because it knows that it can eliminate every global rival that produces interior LED lights, automobile headlamps, and many other manufactured goods produced elsewhere through the relentless pursuit of absolute advantage. Once those rivals have been removed, China in essence will have developed a monopoly position in international trade.

China does not engage in trade for the gains that are shared with its trading partners. It executes trades in order to ultimately dominate its partners and reduce them to colonies. For our purposes, a colony is a country or area within a country under full or partial control of another country. Hong Kong was a British colony from 1841 to 1997 with the exception of the years 1941 to 1945 when it was occupied by Japan. From 1908 to 1962 Belgium +had a colony in what is now known as the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Chinese colonization is being accomplished by the ongoing construction of a two-lane highway that carries traffic in opposite directions: one direction for supply chain dependency and the other for mergers and acquisitions. China has made large inroads colonizing countries in Europe by acquiring their assets. In Italy, China has spent more than 52 billion euros acquiring partial or complete control of more than 300 companies in banking, telecommunications, automobiles, tires, yachts, and Italy's iconic fashion industry (Nicolazzo 2020).[1] China has acquired partial holdings in shipping terminals in Valencia, Bilbao, Antwerp, Las Palmos, and Rotterdam (Rapoza 2020).

China has been a member of the WTO since 2001 (WTO no date). The United States has been on the top of the Chinese list of foreign-held assets targeted for acquisition. Between 2002 and 2016 China acquired $145 billion in American-owned assets including more than 50 companies each worth at least $50 million (Public Citizen no date). Over the period 2005 to 2019 Chinese investors entered into more than 250 deals with the holders of $180 billion in U.S. assets chiefly in real estate, finance, transportation, and technology. In 2016 alone 61 deals were executed. Since then the number of transactions has fallen significantly (Scissors 2020).

Chinese investors own many U.S. companies including GE Appliances, AMC, the Waldorf Astoria, Motorola Mobility, Smithfield Foods, Sotheby's, MD Anderson Cancer Center Proton Therapy Center, and KHSL-TV (Morris 2017; Public Citizen no date). For several years China has been negotiating a complete acquisition of Genworth Financial, a Fortune 500 insurance holding company (PR Newswire 2020). Chinese investors tried but failed to acquire the Chicago Stock Exchange because the Securities and Exchange Commission would not approve the deal (Temple-West 2018).

China's absolute advantage trade policy has reaped enormous rewards. By March 2020 the Chinese had accumulated foreign exchange reserves of USD 3.061 trillion (Trading Economics 2020a) earned by running trade surpluses with its trading partners. In sharp contrast, the United States in February 2020 had accumulated foreign exchange reserves of USD 128 billion (Trading Economics 2020b).

In 2019 alone, the Chinese trade surplus with the United States was $345.6 billion (Amadeo 2020). China uses its foreign exchange reserves to acquire equity positions in companies around the world. From that perspective, China is able to build a global empire importantly because U.S. consumers and producers turn to Chinese manufacturers principally for their low-cost computers, cell phones, apparel, and fashion. The United States does not sell enough commercial aircraft, soybeans, and semiconductors to close the gap (Amadeo 2020). After slapping a tariff on U.S. soybeans in 2018 China more recently has begun buying more soybeans from the United States (Kopf 2019), but to handle the overall trade deficit with China, the United States still has to borrow money from China, sell equity positions in U.S. companies, or both. Thus, the colonizing logic of the Bank of China having two branch locations in New York, one each in Los Angeles and Chicago, along with Grand Cayman, Panama, and Brasil, and ten more in Canada (Bank of China no date), and acquiring five major banks in Italy (Nicolazzo 2020). The Chinese Chamber of Commerce has locations in Hawaii, Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, Seattle, San Francisco, and Cincinnati.[2]

In November 2000 China held a total of $58.9 billion in U.S. Treasury securities (CEIC no date).

---

[1] For more on the Italian/Chinese connection, see Reuters 2019.

[2] We were unable to find a listing of all the chambers of commerce operated by China in the United States. The ones listed above were found by googling "Chinese Chamber of Commerce [city]".

Today its holdings amount to $1.09 trillion. At an interest rate of 2 percent, U.S. taxpayers pay China roughly $22 billion a year in interest. Only Japan has greater current holdings of U.S. Treasuries (U.S. Treasury 2020). China is a rival of the United States because its communist regime is committed to becoming the world's only superpower. The Japanese democracy is an ally of the United States and no poses no such threat.

China's second highway to colonization is supply-chain dependency which is the direct and intended result of her policy of relentlessly pursuing absolute advantage. The Chinese are doing what any student in an introductory course in free-enterprise economics is taught: *homo economicus* relentlessly pursues maximum personal net advantage. Examples follow.

China has become a major source of automotive parts including brakes, lithium batteries, engines, engine parts, and generators. China's share of U.S. automotive parts has nearly doubled since 2007 no doubt due to heavy subsidies from the Chinese government. Today the United States is the largest importer of Chinese auto parts. The U.S. dependency on China is probably even greater because China supplies subcomponents to Mexico and Canada that are used in vehicles exported to the United States. Further, China has at least 105 suppliers in the United States along with Chinese firms located outside China that supply auto parts to the United States. China, however, is not a significant importer of U.S. vehicles (Coffin 2019, pp. 1-4, 7-9).

China's record of creating supply-chain dependency is truly impressive when it comes to electronics. In 2017, the last year before the imposition of tariffs on China by President Trump, the U.S. imported $260 billion in electronics including smart speakers, virtual reality electronics, drones, and wide-screen televisions. China's share of global electronics production is growing as Mexico has been shifting production of televisions to China (Morley 2018). On the other hand, U.S. production of computer and electronic products dropped from $53.9 billion in 2015 to $44.2 billion in 2017 to $41.0 billion in 2019 (BEA 2018; BEA 2020).

We were unable to find primary-source information confirming China's share of the U.S. market for pharmaceuticals. However, what we did find suggests the following shares: antibiotics (97 percent), ibuprofen (95 percent), and hydrocortisone (91 percent) (Huang 2020; Huang 2019; The Pharmaletter 2020; Taylor 2020).

The Census Bureau (2020a), however, estimates that in 2018 U.S. imports of Chinese pharmaceuticals and medicines (NAICS code 32541) amounted to $3.2 billion and U.S. exports to China of the same class of products totaled $3.3 billion. Much of that trade is accounted for as related-party trade which in this instance involves trade by U.S. companies with subsidiaries in China and by the U.S. subsidiaries of Chinese companies with their parent companies. Without distinguishing between related-party trade and other trade, the Bureau (2020a) reported that U.S. imports of Chinese pharmaceutical preparations (end-use code 40100) increased from $1.7 billion in 2010 to $3.0 billion in 2018.

Arriving at accurate estimates of U.S. dependence on China for pharmaceuticals is made even more difficult because India imports large quantities of APIs from China which India in turn uses in the manufacture of generic drugs which it exports to the United States (The Pharmaletter 2020).

In a statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce Janet Woodcock (2019) said the following about Chinese production of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs).

> … we do not know whether Chinese facilities are actually producing APIs, how much they are producing, or whether the APIs they are producing are being distributed worldwide, including the United States.

Woodcock is Director of the FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research. Independent researcher and author of *China Rx; Exposing the Risks of America's Dependence on China for Medicine*, Rosemary Gibson (2019) concurs with Woodcock's assessment.[3]

THE DARK SIDE

In the following, the dark side of trade with China is traced in terms of only two issues: illegal exports of fentanyl to the United States and legal exports of contaminated food.[4] Fentanyl is a Schedule II prescription pain-killer (Preuss 2019). The drug is 50-100 times more potent than morphine, is mixed with heroin, cocaine, and meth, and is known on the street by various names including China Girl and China White. Fentanyl along with other synthetic opioids is the most common drug involved in drug overdose in the United States (National Institute of Drug Abuse 2019).

There appears to be a connection between the producers of fentanyl in China and drug cartels in Mexico that bring illegal shipments across the border into the United States (Deprez 2018) and is reinforced in general terms by the Drug Enforcement Administration (Bonn 2018). However, it is difficult to nail down the extent of this illegal trade precisely because the parties most likely involved take elaborate steps to hide their activities and deny their involvement. The Chinese leadership flat out denies claims that they are implicated (Wang 2019). We are left with largely anecdotal information gleaned from indictments and convictions of persons and organizations such as the following.

At a 2019 press conference on the indictment of three Chinese nationals for importing and distributing fentanyl, the U.S. district attorney made the following observation.

> Make no mistake: China is waging an undeclared war on our country and our American way of life, with deadly drugs serving as its weapon of choice…. China is supplying the United States with the most potent and deadly fentanyl and other synthetic opioids on the market today (U.S. Department of Justice 2019).

The following description of fentanyl originated with a former special agent for the U.S. State Department and current executive officer for a private intelligence firm:

---

[3] See The Actuary 2020 for information on the risks associated with Chinese supply chains.

[4] Other important issues such as fraud and the quality of goods produced in China are not addressed herein. See, for instance, Grönkvist 2020.

> It's compact. It's valuable. It's fantastic for the smugglers and it's terrible for law enforcement (Deprez 2018).

At least as far back as 2007, China has been shipping food to the United States that has been contaminated with cancer-causing chemicals, banned antibiotics, bacteria, and illegal pesticides (Weiss 2007). Because only one percent of all imports at that time were being inspected by the FDA only a very small amount of "filthy" (the official term) food, identified as unfit for human consumption, was caught and stopped at the border (Eban 2019, pp. 233-234).

In the first four months of 2020 the Food and Drug Administration issued more than 50 import alerts for food products imported from China. In almost all of those cases the alert stated that the product was detained without physical examination for a wide range of reasons including decomposition and/or histamines, chloramphemicol, netrofurans, listeria monocytogenes. salmonella, and heavy-metal contamination (FDA 2020).

U.S. food imports from China fell precipitously between 2018 and 2019 due no doubt to the trade war between the two giants. Food shipments to the United States in every one of the nine food classifications that were valued at greater than $100 million in 2018 fell by huge dollar amounts. For example, vegetables dropped by 28 percent, fish and shellfish by 34 percent, fruits and frozen juices by 50 percent, and meat products by 85 percent[5] (Census Bureau 2020b).

It is beyond the scope of this report to make any claims indicating that contaminated food exports from China originate in air, water, soil contamination on Chinese farmland, in the transportation of crops to processing facilities, the processing and packaging of food, the shipment from China to the United States, or the time it takes to get it into the hands of the end-user. Even so, a recent review of 100 studies regarding the extent of heavy-metal pollution on farmland and urban soils in China stated the following.

> As a result of soil pollution, green plants and agricultural grain products are *increasingly* polluted, creating public and ecological health risks (Shifaw 2018; emphasis added).

Caveat emptor.

CHINA'S WEAPONIZATION OF GLOBAL TRADE

Chinese global trade policy has taken a page from the jujitsu manual which instructs the beginning student to use an adversary's own strength to defeat him. America's strength is its relentless pursuit of maximum personal net advantage -- ever lower cost of production, ever lower prices, ever higher profits, ever greater returns on investments. American consumers buy Chinese goods because they are cheaper than U.S. produced goods. American producers buy Chinese machinery, parts, and equipment because they are less expensive than the same goods produced at home. American

[5] Five-digit end-use codes 00130, 01000, 00120, and 00100, respectively.

companies locate in China to profit from selling products to hundreds of millions of Chinese consumers eager for American produced goods. American investors, including managers of private mutual funds and public employee pension funds,[6] purchase shares in Chinese companies because of the attractive returns on their investments.

U.S. senators and representatives depend on China to purchase securities from the U.S. Treasury so that they can continue decades of deficit spending. American colleges and universities boost revenues and cut their costs by recruiting Chinese graduate students who are a cheap source of labor as instructors for large undergraduate classes.

Knowing American obsession with money, the Chinese intentionally use their lower manufacturing costs to drive U.S. manufacturers out of business so that they can raise prices once they have achieved market control (Gibson 2019). Gibson puts the Chinese global strategy in these chilling words:

> China doesn't have to hack the electric grid or fire a missile to take America down: it can withhold antibiotics and other essential medicines (Gibson 2019).

The continuing Chinese trade surplus with countries around the world means that China is in a position to acquire various international currencies of which the USD and perhaps another (euro) are hard currencies. With hard currencies available to them, developing countries with weak national currencies can trade with China. A trade surplus puts China in the position of a creditor to its trading partners and in a position to purchase the assets of countries with which it has a trade surplus. The trade surplus is a tool of Chinese economic and geo-political policy. The Chinese communist government has weaponized trade and is colonizing countries around the world. The United States is China's crown jewel. Twenty years ago John Paul II, himself an advocate of greater cooperation among the most powerful nations engaged in global trade,[7] warned that globalization might become colonization (John Paul II 2001b).[8] America did not listen.

Consider China's one-trillion-dollar holdings of U.S. Treasuries. If China were to dump some of its holdings, the price of all such securities would fall, the yield would automatically rise, forcing the Treasury to pay a higher rate of interest on new issues, driving other interest rates higher in

---

[6] The Thrift Savings Plan which is a defined contribution plan providing benefits to U.S. civil service employees and retirees, along with uniformed military personnel, has roughly $600 billion under management. Despite objections from several members of Congress, TSP last year invested in an index fund with holdings in Chinese government-owned companies (Anderson 2020).

A public controversy has arisen in Congress regarding investments in Chinese companies totaling $3.1billion made for CalPERS by CIO Yu Ben Meng who is reputed to have said "I have a deep attachment to the motherland and my roots are in China" (Grimes 2020). CalPERS has denied that Meng played a role in decisions regarding investments in China (CalPERS 2020).

[7] Four years before the World Trade Organization was launched in 1995 John Paul argued for new international agencies to "oversee and direct the economy to the common good" (John Paul II 1991, §58). The Holy See has held observer status at the WTO since 1997 (WTO no date; GCatholic 2020).

[8] See also John Paul II 1999 and John Paul II 2001a.

order to compete with the rates available from the Treasury. That, in turn, would make borrowing more costly, slow down consumer and capital expenditures, and create a drag on U.S. GDP and employment. This is just another manifestation as to how the United States is losing its status as a sovereign nation.

AMERICA'S FUTURE

China does not want to trade with the United States. It wants to dominate. Specifically, it wants to colonize. In the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries European countries established and administered colonial empires based on trading manufactured goods for natural resources. Textiles for cocoa. Plows for timber. Iron cooking pots for diamonds. In many instances, that kind of trade was not enough. The imperial powers took slaves and indentured servants. In the twenty-first century. China has been acting like an colonial power, trading whatever it is able to manufacture under conditions of absolute advantage for American independence. Of late, there are indications that China is using slave labor to further extend its absolute advantage. Like the monarchs of old, President Xi Jinping is China's lifetime ruler.

Two and one-half centuries ago, American colonists declared their independence from King George III of England. Last century Americans paid dearly so they would not be ruled by tyrants from Germany, Japan, or Russia. Two years ago President Trump began imposing tariffs on U.S. imports from China hoping that they would force the Chinese to the negotiating table to work on a better trade agreement.[9] In a sense he was trying to break U.S. dependence on China and help restore American sovereignty. Earlier this year he signed a trade agreement that he described as just a first-step in changing the terms and conditions of trade with China.

Continuous, unfettered free trade where China has no obligation other than to its own self-interest undermines the promise that both the Chinese and the Americans can expect to experience gains through the trading process and ultimately leads to a China using absolute advantage to sweep most of the gains off the table and an America left with the scraps.

Whenever there are no restraints on using absolute advantage at every turn, the market system cannot assure that free trade is fair for everyone involved. Justice is needed whereby both parties regard one another as equals, respect one another, and resist any opportunity to turn proper gain for both into ill-gotten gain for one. Without the moderating influence of justice, absolute advantage in the hands of the unscrupulous transforms globalization into colonialism.

China is preparing a new plan "China Standards 2035" that aims at achieving Chinese world dominance in next-generation technologies. This plan follows China's already implemented plan to dominate world manufacturing (Kharpal 2020). More than 50 year ago the Soviet Union made clear its intention to defeat capitalism and replace it with socialism. Some Western commentators and journalists at that time said that Premier Nikita Khrushchev really meant that "we will bury you." Spokespersons for the Kremlin denied that was his intent (CIA 2002).

[9] For information on Chinese trade barriers, see USTR 2019.

In a detailed history of Soviet trade practices since 1914, Boles (1954) stated that since the end of WWII the Soviets had targeted its satellites in Eastern and Central Europe for oil and agricultural products, and its communist partners in China for iron, coal, manganese, tin, wood and oils, and Southeast Asia for rice, rubber, and tin. He predicted that their next move would be trade with the Near East. Boles concluded that the Soviet Union was intent on end-game of the spread of communism around the world. The evidence regarding the global trade practices of China, exporting finished goods as compared to the Soviet Union importing natural resources, points to the same political objective. Domination.

Will the extreme volatility of equity markets, the massive declines in production and employment, and the large and growing numbers of deaths here and around the world, all attributable to a coronavirus that originated in China, finally awaken the American people and their leaders to the realization that China is a predatory trading partner[10] that is committed to reducing the United States to a Chinese colony?

Public opinion hints that the American people may be ready to push back. According to the Pew Research Center fifteen years ago, 35 percent of Americans had an unfavorable opinion of China. Today two of three Americans are unfavorably disposed toward China (Devlin 2020).

If, however, the present crisis fails to awaken Americans to this new global reality because they have been anesthetized by trillions of dollars pouring out of Washington, the Founding Fathers will know that their heirs have put being fed ahead of being free.

[10] Robinson (2019) uses that very same expression in his expose of China global trading practices which includes comments on investments in Chinese sovereign bonds by U.S. investors including pension funds and university endowment funds. See The White House 2018 for details regarding China’s aggressive economic practices.

REFERENCES

Amadeo, Kimberly (2020). "U.S. Trade Deficit with China and Why It's so High," *The Balance,* February 26, available at https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-china-trade-deficit-causes-effects-and-solutions-3306277

Anderson, Brian (2020). "TSP Still Investing in 'Shady' Chinese Companies," *401KSpecialist,* April 15, available at https://401kspecialistmag.com/tsp-still-investing-in-shady-chinese-companies/

Bank of China (no date). "Bank of China American Branches," available at https://www.boc.cn/en/aboutboc/ab6/200812/t20081216_494260.html

Boles, John (1954). "The Soviet System of Foreign Trade," *Review of Social Economy*, Volume 12, Number 2, pp.135-146.

Bonn, Tess (2018). "DEA Chief Warns Mexican Cartel Opioids Single Biggest Criminal Threat to America," *The Hill*, October 1, available at https://thehill.com/hilltv/rising/409244-dea-chief-says-mexican-cartels-opioid-push-biggest-criminal-threat-to-america

Bureau of Economic Analysis (2018). "Gross Domestic Product, Fourth Quarter and Annual 2017 (third estimate), Corporate Profits: Fourth Quarter and Annual 2017," U.S. Department of Commerce, March 28.

Bureau of Economic Analysis (2020). "Gross Domestic Product, Fourth Quarter and Annual 2019 (third estimate), Corporate Profits: Fourth Quarter and Annual 2019," U.S. Department of Commerce, March 26.

CalPERS (2020). "CalPERS Investments in China," February 19, available at https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/investments/asset-classes/global-equity/calpers-investments-in-china

CEIC (no date). "China Holdings of U.S. Treasuries," available at https://www.ceicdata.com/en/china/holdings-of-us-treasury-securities/holdings-of-us-treasury-securities

CIA (2002). "Khrushchev's 'We Will Bury You'," report approved for release January 22.

Coffin, David (2019). "China's Growing Role in U.S. Automotive Supply Chains," Office of Industries, U.S. International Trade Commission, Working Paper ID-060, August, 1-16 pp.

Deprez, Esmé E., Li Hui, and Ken Wills (2018). "Deadly Chinese Fentanyl is Creating a New Era of Drug Kingpins," *Bloomberg,* May 22, available at (cached) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-05-22/deadly-chinese-fentanyl-is-creating-a-new-era-of-drug-kingpins

Devlin, Kat, Laura Silver, Christine Huang (2020). "U.S. Views of China Increasingly Negative Amid Coronavirus Outbreak," Pew Research Center, April 21, available at https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/04/21/u-s-views-of-china-increasingly-negative-amid-coronavirus-outbreak/

Eban, Katherine (2019). Chapter 19: Solving for X, May 25, 2007, Cleveland Ohio, in *Bottle of Lies: The Inside Story of the Generic Drug Boom*, New York: HarperCollins Publishers.

FDA (2020). "Import Alerts for [China]," available at https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cms_ia/country_CN.html

GCatholic (2020). "Holy See Representation: World Trade Organization," *GCatholic.org*, February 23, available at http://www.gcatholic.org/dioceses/nunciature/org209.htm

Gibson, Rosemary (2019). Testimony -- House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Health, October 30, available at. https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:Vvkik2utLywJ:https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/Testimony-Gibson-API_103019.pdf+&cd=13&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

Grimes, Katy (2020). "California's CalPERS Public Employee Pension Fund Invested in Blacklisted Chinese Companies," *California Globe*, February 14, available at https://californiaglobe.com/section-2/californias-calpers-public-employee-pension-fund-invested-in-blacklisted-chinese-companies/

Grönkvist, Fredrik (2020). "Importing from China – How to Avoid Quality Issues and Fraud," *Profitable Venture Magazine*, available at https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:Onv1Vib0ZIUJ:https://www.profitableventure.com/importing-china-fraud-issues/+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

Huang, Yanzhong (2019). "U.S. Dependence on Pharmaceutical Products from China," Council on Foreign Relations, August 14, available at https://www.cfr.org/blog/us-dependence-pharmaceutical-products-china

Huang, Yanzhong (2020). "The Coronavirus Outbreak Could Disrupt the U.S. Drug Supply," Council on Foreign Relations, March 5, available at https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/coronavirus-disrupt-us-drug-supply-shortages-fda

John Paul II (1991). "Centesimus Annus," May 1, available at http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus.html

John Paul II (1999). "Ecclesia in America," apostolic exhortation, Mexico City, January 22, available at http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_22011999_ecclesia-in-america.html

John Paul II (2001a). "Address to the Members of the Foundation for 'Ethics and Economics'" May 17, available at http://www.clerus.org/bibliaclerusonline/en/fi3.htm#qc

John Paul II (2001b). "Address of the Holy Father to the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences," April 27, §4, available at http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/2001/april/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20010427_pc-social-sciences.html

Kharpal, Arjun (2020). "Power is 'up-for-grabs': Behind China's Plan to Shape the Future of Next Generation Tech," CNBC, April 27, available at https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/27/china-standards-2035-explained.html

Kopf, Dan (2019). "China Has Already Started to Buy US Soybeans Again," *Quartz*, December 25, available at https://qz.com/1775228/us-soybeans-exports-to-china-soar-as-partial-trade-deal-seems-likely/

Morley, Hugh R. (2018). "China Dominates Growing US Electronics Imports," *JOC.com.* May 25, available at https://www.joc.com/breakbulk/china-dominates-us-electronics-imports-%E2%80%93-big-and-small-screens_20180525.html

Morris, Chris (2017). "10 Iconic American Companies Owned by Chinese Investors," *CNBC*, May 11, available at https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/11/10-iconic-american-companies-owned-by-chinese-investors.html

National Institute of Drug Abuse (2019). "Fentanyl," National Institute of Health, February 2, available at https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/fentanyl

Nicolazzo, Giacomino (2020). "Italy's Communist Recipe for Disaster," *FrontPage Magazine.* April 9, available at https://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/2020/04/italys-communist-recipe-disaster-frontpagemagcom/

PR Newswire (2020). "Genworth and Oceanside Provide Update on Pending Transaction," April 1, available at https://finance.yahoo.com/news/genworth-oceanwide-pending-transaction-214700702.html

Preuss, Charles V., Arun Kavala, and Kevin C. King (2019). "Prescriptions of Controlled Substances.: Benefits and Risks," *StatPearls Publishing*, November 16, available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK537318/

Public Citizen (no date). "Chinese Investment in the United States Database," available at https://www.citizen.org/article/chinese-investment-in-the-united-states-database/

Rapoza, Kenneth (2020). "Watch Out for China Buying Spree, NATO Warns," *Forbes*, April 18. available at https://www.google.com/search?safe=active&sxsrf=ALeKk02C-stMjd02gt7RVKtjrxkBlxyhWA%3A1587314026084&source=hp&ei=an2cXrbmAceUtQXK4ZHADA&q=forbes+china+buying+spree&oq=fo&gs_lcp=CgZwc3ktYWIQARgAMgQIIxAnMgQIIxAnMgQIIxAnMgQIABBDMggIABCDARCRAjIFCAAQkQIyAggAMgUIABCDATIFCAAQgwEyBAgAEENQ9AtY9BFgnDRoAXAAeACAAfoCiAHpA5IBBzAuMS4wLjGYAQCgAQGqAQdnd3Mtd2l6&sclient=psy-ab

Reuters (2019). "Italy Signs Deals Worth 2.5 billion Euros with China," March 24, available at https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/25/italy-signs-deals-worth-2point5-billion-euros-with-china.html

Robinson Jr., Roger W. (2019). "Why and How the U.S. Should Stop Financing China's Bad Actors," *Imprimis*, a publication of Hillsdale College., October 2019, Volume 48, Number 10, pp. 2-6.

Scissors, Derek (2020). "Chinese Investments in the US – Handout," American Enterprise Institute, January 30, available at https://www.aei.org/multimedia/chinese-investments-us-handout/

Shifaw, Eshetu (2018). "Review of Heavy Metals Pollution in China in Agricultural and Urban Soils," *Journal of Health and Pollution*, June, 8(18), available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6239058/

Taylor, Guy (2020). "'Wake-up Call': Chinese Control of U.S. Pharmaceutical Supplies Sparks Growing Concern," *The Washington Times*, March 17, available at https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/mar/17/china-threatens-restrict-critical-drug-exports-us/

Temple-West, Patrick (2018). "Chinese Thwarted in Bid to Buy Chicago Stock Exchange," *Politico*, February 16, available at https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/16/china-chicago-stock-exchange-352343

The Actuary (2020). "Study Reveals Supply Chain Risks in China," available at https://www.theactuary.com/archive/old-articles/part-4/study-reveals-supply-chain-risks-in-china/

The Pharmaletter (2020). "Indian Government Moves on APIs, as Chinese Supplies Are Returning," January 4, available at https://www.thepharmaletter.com/article/indian-government-moves-on-apis-as-chinese-supplies-are-returning

The White House (2018). "How China's Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies of the United States and the World," White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, June.

Trading Economics (2020a). "Chinese Foreign Exchange Reserves," April 7, available at https://tradingeconomics.com/china/foreign-exchange-reserves

Trading Economics (2020b). "United States Foreign Exchange Reserves," available at https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/foreign-exchange-reserves

U.S. Census Bureau (2020a). "U.S. Related-Party Trade" Foreign Trade Division, available at https://relatedparty.ftd.census.gov/

U.S. Census Bureau (2020b). "U.S. Imports from China by 5-digit End-Use Code, 2010-2019," available at https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/product/enduse/imports/c5700.html

U.S. Department of Justice (2019). "Three Chinese Nationals Using the Alias 'Alex' Indicted in the United States for Conspiring to Import and Distribute Deadly Opioids," U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, October 1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/three-chinese-nationals-using-alias-alex-indicted-united-states-conspiring-import-and

U.S. Treasury (2020). "Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities," February, available at https://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/mfh.txt

USTR (2019). "2019 National Trade Estimate Report of Foreign Trade Barriers," United States Trade Representative, pp. 97-118.

Wang, Yanan and Fu Ting (2019). "China Says Trump's Claims About Fentanyl Origin Are False," *Associated Press*, September 3, available at https://apnews.com/7010fb02262f49f585347490cdd950b8

Weiss, Rick (2007). "Tainted Chinese Imports Common – In Four Months, FDA Refused 298 Shipments," *Washington Post*, May 20, reprinted by *Science and Environmental Health Network*, July 11, 2013, available at https://www.sehn.org/sehn/tainted-chinese-imports-common-in-four-months-fda-refused-298-shipments

Woodcock, Janet (2019). Testimony -- "FDA Safeguarding Pharmaceutical Supply Chain in a Global Economy," House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Health, October 30, available at https://www.fda.gov/news-events/congressional-testimony/safeguarding-pharmaceutical-supply-chains-global-economy-10302019

WTO (no date). "Members and Observers," World Trade Organization, available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm